METHOD, THEORY & REALITY
Past Events Friday March 17. (3:30-5:30 PM).
Emelia Miller (UMass Amherst)
“The Prudence of Prudential Naturalism: How to Do “Good For” Well”
Abstract. Well-being, also known as prudential value, refers to whatever makes a life non-instrumentally good for the person living it. Well-being is the object of immense practical, philosophical, and scientific concern. Assessments of well-being help to guide our decisions in everyday life, from relationships, to health decisions, to education and career choices. Well-being is increasingly the object of governmental and institutional policy, and even policies that are not aimed directly at promoting it can be evaluated in terms of their impacts on well-being. Colleges and universities routinely offer programs designed to help students maintain their well-being in the face of academic and personal stress. However, debates over the nature of well-being have raged since the beginning of philosophical inquiry, leaving us in a bad position when it comes to making headway on addressing those practical and scientific concerns. The goal of this talk is to show how the application of naturalistic methodology can help us to resolve the philosophical stalemate and thus to make progress in our practical and scientific projects relating to well-being.
Talk link -- Email for the passcode
Thursday March 23. (4-6 PM).
Marissa Bennett (Toronto)
“The Conventionality of Real-Valued Quantities”
Abstract. The representational theory of measurement provides a collection of results that specify the conditions under which an attribute admits of numerical representation. The original architects of the theory interpreted the formalism operationally and explicitly acknowledged that some aspects of their representations are conventional. There have been a number of recent efforts to reinterpret the formalism to arrive at a more metaphysically robust account of physical quantities. In this paper we argue that the conventional elements of the representations afforded by the representational theory of measurement require careful scrutiny as one moves toward such an interpretation. To illustrate why, we show that there is a sense in which the very number system in which one represents a physical quantity such as mass or length is conventional. We argue that this result does not undermine the project of reinterpreting the representational theory of measurement for metaphysical purposes in general, but it does undermine a certain class of inferences about the nature of physical quantities that some have been tempted to draw.
Friday April 7. (3:30-5:30 PM).
Allison Aitken (Columbia)
"Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu on the Principle of Sufficient Reason"
Abstract: Canonical defenders of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), such as Leibniz and Spinoza, are metaphysical foundationalists of one stripe or another. This is curious since the PSR—which says that everything has a ground, cause, or explanation—in effect, denies fundamental entities. In this talk, I explore the apparent inconsistency between metaphysical foundationalism and approaches to metaphysical system building that are driven by a commitment to the PSR. I do so by analyzing how Indian Buddhist philosophers arrive at both foundationalist and anti-foundationalist positions motivated by implicit commitments to different versions of the PSR. Specifically, I will focus on the role of the PSR in helping to the shape the metaphysical systems of foundationalist Sautrāntika Abhidharma Buddhists as represented by Vasubandhu and anti-foundationalist Madhyamaka Buddhists as represented by Nāgārjuna. I begin by introducing the Buddhist Principle of Dependent Origination (pratītyasamutpāda) as a proto-PSR that is restricted to causal explanation. Next, I show how Vasubandhu’s Sautrāntika Abhidharma metaphysics is shaped by a qualified commitment to causal and metaphysical grounding versions of the PSR. I then reveal how Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka metaphysics is driven by an unrestricted and exceptionless commitment to causal and metaphysical grounding versions of the PSR. Finally, I consider how Nāgārjuna’s account may put him in a unique position to respond to some contemporary objections to the PSR.
Friday April 28. (1-3 PM).
Ezra Rubenstein (Berkeley)
"The Nomic Exclusion Argument for Physicalism"
Abstract: Many of us are convinced of physicalism: the view that all fundamental notions feature in the ultimate physical theory of the world. It is widely agreed that a good reason to be highly confident in physicalism is the success of physics since Newton. But how exactly does the argument from success proceed? A popular formulation is the ‘causal exclusion argument’: the success of physics indicates that everything is physically caused, and this leaves ‘no causal work’ left over for anything non-physical. However, this argument rests on a premise about causation which is far too contentious to justify any great confidence in physicalism. Instead, I suggest, the real issue concerns laws of nature: the success of physics indicates that everything can be subsumed under physical laws, leaving ‘no nomic work’ left over.
Friday June 9 (3-5 PM).
Alison Springle (Miami)
"Radicalizing Practical Representations"
ABSTRACT: "Practical Representations" are psychological representations with action-related contents. Such representations seem to be involved in a range of psychological phenomena. These include perception and action capacities we share with other animals as well as moral beliefs and implicit biases that reflect distinctively human conceptual capacities. I argue that a unifying account of the content of practical representations is desirable and that meeting the desiderata on such an account motivates a “robustly radical” view of practical representations. The robustly radical view contrasts with “conservative,” “moderate,” and “relatively radical” views. Conservative views hold that practical representations are a species of propositional representation. I argue that such views satisfy certain desiderata only at the expense of sacrificing others. Moderate views hold that practical representations are a proposition-esque species of non-propositional representation. I argue that they don’t fare much better than conservative views. Radical views hold that practical representations are a species of non-propositional representation and are either relatively or robustly distinct from proposition-esque representations. Relatively radical views not only fail to satisfy the desiderata but also struggle with cogency, whereas, I argue, thoroughly radicalizing practical representations avoids such troubles. Drawing on my “practical access” analysis of representation, I develop a robustly radical view of practical representations. After demonstrating how my view satisfies the desiderata and solves several specific problems that arose for the other views, I close by noting a few ways my view sheds light on interesting phenomena in which practical representations feature.
MTR 2023 - 2024
Thursday October 26, 4-6 PM (EST):
Peter Tan (Fordham)
"Analogical Distance in Scientific Representation"
ABSTRACT. Discussions of the epistemology and methodological foundations of scientific modeling sometimes treat all scientific models as if they are metaphors or analogies. I argue that this treatment misses out on important nuances regarding the distinct roles that metaphorical or analogical reasoning can play in scientific modeling. This paper then develops a taxonomy of analogical "distance" in scientific representation ('distance', of course, also being a metaphor) that aims to properly distinguish between roles for metaphor and analogy that are more or less representational. Then, I show why any such taxonomy matters and how it can help resolve or improve existing debates in the epistemology of scientific modeling.
Zoom Link -- Passcode: 792136 BROKEN! Instead use: https://umass-amherst.zoom.us/j/91811632333
Tuesday November 21, 4.5-6.5 (EST):
Taylor Pincin (Columbia)
“How Aristotelian Forms can be Simple and Complex”
ABSTRACT. There appears to be a tension between two key aspects of the way Aristotle conceived of form (eidos). On the one hand, form is meant to serve as the unifying principle of matter-form compounds, and in order to fulfill this role, Aristotle seems to think that form itself must be simple, where minimally, this involves being incomposite in some sense. On the other hand, Aristotle is committed to the view that forms are definable, not just nominally, but really. But it is generally true that things with real definitions are complex in some sense; they can be analyzed into further entities. For example, it is generally agreed that the real definition of water is H2O, and water quite literally can be broken down into hydrogen and oxygen. In this paper, I tease apart two distinct ways of being complex and simple such that Aristotle can retain his commitment to the simplicity of form while also maintaining that they are complex in that they have real definitions.
Zoom Link -- No Passcode Required
Thursday December 7, 4-6 PM (EST)
Verónica Gómez Sánchez (UC Berkeley)
"Deflationist Cognitive Science"
ABSTRACT. According to a version of deflationism about truth, attributions of truth-conditional contents to mental states do not play a robust role in the best scientific explanations of behavior. Theories that appear to invoke truth-conditional contents can be paraphrased in terms of less metaphysically problematic notions, without loss in explanatory power. This talk develops a challenge for representational realism based on the availability of such deflationist paraphrases, building on the work of Hartry Field and Frances Egan. I consider a number of popular attempts to clarify the explanatory role of content and argue that none of them yields a satisfactory response to the deflationist challenge, as I understand it. I end by presenting a more promising response on behalf of the realist, but show that it rests on potentially controversial assumptions about the role of truth conditions in structuring neural mechanisms.
Zoom Link -- No Passcode Required
Wednesday February 21, 5.5-7.5 PM (EST)
Jared Hanson-Park (Texas A&M)
"Scientific Episodes as Epistemic Situations"
ABSTRACT. The notion of a scientific episode is pervasive in the history and philosophy of science. Case studies examine the scientific methods used in various scientific episodes, discussions of theory change investigate the scientific theories that are replaced or superseded in a particular scientific episode, and the debate over the use of values in science seeks to determine whether these values are essential components of scientific reasoning in an episode. Scientific episodes are explicitly invoked in discussions of scientific progress to help determine whether progress has been made. Despite this, it is not clear what a scientific episode is, precisely. This paper will answer those questions by examining the ways in which the notion of scientific episodes is used throughout the philosophy of science. In the end, I will argue that a scientific episode is defined by the epistemic situation of the relevant scientific community at a time and in a culture that is relevant to the philosophical investigation involved.
Zoom Link -- No Passcode Required
Wednesday March 13, 3-5 PM (EST)
Raimund Pils (University of Salzburg)
"From Scientific Realism to Epistemic Autonomy: Reframing Science Reporting"
ABSTRACT. There is no consensus among philosophers of science about how to interpret scientific theories. Epistemic voluntarists argue that multiple options of scientific realism and anti-realism are equally rational. However, this is in stark contrast to how scientific findings are currently reported in science communication. I will propose a new model of science communication built on the idea of epistemic autonomy which better aligns with widely accepted communication norms, such as consensus reporting.
Zoom Link -- No Passcode Required
Wednesday April 10, 6-8 PM (EST)
Daniel Swaim (Kansas State University)
"Representation & Commitment: A Defense of Ontic Explanation"
ABSTRACT. In this paper I defend the ontic conception of scientific explanation. Over the course of the history of philosophy of science, there has been substantial disagreement among philosophers over the nature of scientific explanation. For the most part, philosophers of science have divided into two camps, one endorsing an ontic conception, which emphasizes that explanations are worldly entities, the other endorsing epistemic conception, understanding explanations rather as representations. Here I offer a defense of ontic explanations, specifically emphasizing misunderstandings of the notion of representation. Explanations are not representations, but representations are central to explanatory acts, and the successful among such acts direct us toward the proper objects of ontological commitment, and those objects are, ultimately, explanations.
Zoom Link -- No Passcode Required
