METHOD, THEORY & REALITY
Upcoming Events (Fall 2024)
(If you are interested in attending any of the following meetings, please email us for the Zoom link!)
Thursday November 7, 4:00 - 6:00 PM (EST)
Jillian Powell. (UMass Amherst)
"Process Reliabilism is Permissive and Plausible"
ABSTRACT. The question of whether there is a unique epistemically rational doxastic attitude given a body of evidence has been a focus of discussion in the literature. Impermissivists hold that rationality recommends at most one doxastic attitude for a body of evidence, but permissivists hold that rationality sometimes permits more than one such attitude. Surprisingly, however, the debate between permissivists and impermissivists has taken place largely within a context that presupposes an internalist view of justification. This paper seeks to change that by exploring what an externalist– more specifically, a process reliabilist– should think about the debate. My argument consists of two parts: First, I will argue that process reliabilists should be permissivists. Then, I will argue that this process reliabilist version of permissivism is superior to its internalist alternatives.
Friday November 22, 4:00 - 6:00 PM (EST)
Noga Gratvol. (NYU)
"The Rationality of Perception as the Rationality of Attention"
ABSTRACT. We have some evidence that our emotions and beliefs can affect our perceptual experiences. If you believe your friend is mad at you, their neutral expression may look like anger to you. Some philosophers argue that in such cases, the resulting perceptual experiences are rationally assessable. In particular, they argue that in the relevant cases perceptual experiences are the result of an inference or quasi-inference from person-level mental states, and can be assessed according to inferential norms. Your experience of your friend as angry is inferred from your antecedent belief that they’re mad at you. The experience is unjustified either because the initial belief is unjustified, or because this is a bad form of inference.
In this talk, I argue against the inferential understanding of the rationality of perception, and propose an alternative, attention-based view. I accept that some perceptual experiences are rationally assessable, but argue that there are important differences between the rationality of these experiences and the rationality of inferred beliefs. After making the negative case, I will outline some norms on the rationality of attention, and explain how they capture our intuitive judgments about different cases.
Thursday December 12, 4:00 - 6:00 PM (EST)
Lindsay Brainard. (University of Alabama, Birmingham)
"Is Creativity a Norm of Inquiry?"
ABSTRACT. In this paper, I examine the question of whether creativity is a norm of inquiry. Recently, epistemologists have argued that there are norms that govern our inquiries in addition to the traditionally accepted epistemic norms. I examine three reasons to think creativity is a norm of inquiry and three reasons to think it is not. Ultimately, I argue that there is a strong case to be made for including creativity among the norms of inquiry. I develop and defend a proposal according to which creativity is a norm of exploratory inquiry. It is a positive, substantive norm that applies when enquirers seek to discover something subjectively novel without knowing in advance what they will learn and how they will go about learning it. On my view, creativity is a norm of inquiry that takes the form of an imperfect duty. That is, creativity is rationally required in exploratory inquiries, but agents have considerable latitude in how they fulfill this requirement.